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Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with the development of housing finance in peripheral European 
states. Interestingly, the biggest mortgage and housing booms and busts prior to the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) have occurred in these countries, rather than in the core. This is 
surprising, given the comparatively low level of mortgage debt and the unsophisticated 
financial sectors in the periphery. The mortgage and housing booms and busts have also made 
these countries highly vulnerable to the fallout from the GFC, and have often been associated 
with severe banking and even sovereign debt crises. The paper asks why peripheral countries 
have been particularly vulnerable to housing and mortgage booms and busts; how these have 
shaped their exposure to the GFC, and how the GFC has affected peripheral housing finance. 
Building on literature on housing financialization and varieties of residential capitalism, the 
paper traces trajectories of housing-induced financialization before and after the GFC in four 
European peripheral countries: Hungary, Latvia, Ireland and Iceland. The paper argues that 
their differences notwithstanding, Europe’s East and peripheral Northwest have been 
characterized by high homeownership rates and unsophisticated mortgage markets. The 
evolving EU framework for free movement of capital and provision of financial services as well 
as the availability of ample and cheap credit has induced a trajectory of financialization, which 
has taken two major but not mutually exclusive forms: domestic financial institutions’ reliance 
on funding from wholesale markets, and direct penetration of foreign financial institutions. 
These two forms of financialization attest to a core-periphery relationship in the recent episode 
of housing financialization, whose hierarchical character played out in the crisis. Peripheral 
European countries experienced sudden stops and reversals of capital flows, which badly 
affected their banking systems. Unable to solve the looming banking crises on their own, they 
had to turn to creditors to gain access to much needed capital inflows. Different combinations 
of international conditionality, domestic policy responses and the original level of mortgage 
debt result in different trajectories in housing finance after the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Why have the biggest European mortgage and housing booms and busts prior 
to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) occurred in the continents’ periphery, 
rather than its core? How have mortgage and housing booms affected these 
countries’ vulnerability to the GFC, and how has the GFC affected peripheral 
housing finance? This paper seeks to understand the development of housing 
finance in peripheral European states. A small but growing body of scholarly 
literature in international and comparative political economy has established 
the centrality of housing finance in contemporary capitalism. Housing has 
become a most significant absorber of global liquidity, and innovations in 
housing finance have been identified as the root cause of the GFC (e.g. Aalbers 
2016, Ansell 2014, Schwartz 2009, Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009). At the same 
time, national housing systems differ in how far they have been integrated 
globally, the liquidity of their mortgage markets, and their reliance on housing 
as a social protection mechanism (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009, Schelkle 
2012). While originally the literature associated volatile housing markets and 
soaring mortgage debt with the Anglo-American liberal market economies, 
recent work has shown that these phenomena cross-cut established varieties of 
capitalism (ibid.). The research has so far mostly focused on advanced capitalist 
countries.  
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This paper seeks to probe further into the differences of residential capitalisms 
in Europe, and their pre- and post-crisis trajectories. Specifically, it seeks to 
establish commonalities and differences among peripheral housing finance 
regimes in Europe. The paper argues that their differences notwithstanding, 
Europe’s East, South and peripheral Northwest have been characterized by 
high homeownership rates and unsophisticated mortgage markets. The 
evolving EU framework for free movement of capital and provision of financial 
services as well as the availability of ample and cheap credit has induced a 
trajectory of financialization in these countries, which has taken two major but 
not mutually exclusive forms: domestic financial institutions’ reliance on 
(increasingly short-term) funding from wholesale interbank markets, and 
direct penetration of foreign financial institutions setting off a – mostly foreign 
currency – mortgage lending boom. These two forms of financialization attest 
to a core-periphery relationship in the recent episode of housing 
financialization, whose hierarchical character played out in the crisis. Most 
peripheral European countries experienced sudden stops and reversals of 
capital flows, which badly affected their banking systems. Unable to solve the 
looming banking crises on their own, they had to turn to creditors to gain access 
to much needed capital inflows. A combination of international conditionality, 
domestic policy responses and the original level of mortgage debt result in 
different trajectories in housing finance after the crisis.  
While the paper focusses on similarities in housing finance trajectories, it also 
takes account of the differences in timing of financialization, origins of high 
homeownership regimes, and policy responses. It does so by tracing the 
emergence of peripheral housing finance regimes, and their pre- and post-crisis 
trajectories with four in-depth case studies – Hungary, Latvia, Iceland and 
Ireland. This mix of East and West European countries with different housing 
finance legacies and institutions, and different degrees of integration in the EU 
Dorothee Bohle 
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reflect the diversity of Europe’s periphery.1 Yet, despite their differences, all 
four countries have experienced major housing and mortgage booms, and all 
of them are still reeling from the impact of the GFC on housing and housing 
finance.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews existing literature, 
establishes the puzzle and develops the analytical framework. The third section 
retraces the origins of housing and mortgage booms in the four peripheral 
European countries, and section four analyses crisis exposure and responses. 
The last section concludes. 
 
2. Mortgage finance and housing in (European) capitalism  
 
“Ironically, under the European Union Stability and Growth 
Pact, government debt should be no higher than 60 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Somehow, it has come to pass 
that loading the young people of the EU with mortgages some 
five to nine times their income has become acceptable.” 
John F. Higgins, independent candidate in the 
Irish general elections 20072 
 
The quote above is from an independent candidate in the Irish general elections 
of 2007, who was outraged by the rapid increase of private and mortgage debt, 
and therefore decided to run. Although Higgins could not make an electoral 
breakthrough and soon disappeared into oblivion, he made a crucial point. In 
most European countries, private debt by far surpasses public debt, and an 
                                                 
 
1 This paper does not integrate Southern European cases in its analysis. Yet, some of the arguments 
made here can also be extended to Spain, and to a lesser degree to Portugal and Greece. 
2 Available at: http://www.johnfhiggins.eu/Writings2.html. 
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important chunk of private debt is household debt, locked up in mortgages. In 
Europe, it was Iceland that had the highest mortgage debt relative to GDP. 
Iceland’s public debt in 2007 was 28% and residential mortgage debt 119% of 
GDP. A close second and third in respect to mortgage debt to GDP were the 
Netherlands and Denmark with almost 100 and 93, whereas their public debt 
stood at 42 and 27%, respectively. Among the peripheral European countries, 
the level of residential mortgage debt surpassed that of public debt in Spain, 
Ireland, Iceland and the Baltic States.3 But even in those countries where this 
was not the case, the level of mortgage debt has increased significantly over the 
2000s.4 Indeed, even more stunning than the level of mortgage debt has been 
its increase over the last (two) decades. Figure 1 depicts the increase of 
mortgage debt and house price increases prior to the Great Recession. It shows 
Figure 1 
House price and mortgage lending (2002-2006) 
 
ECE countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Western 
European peripheral countries are Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Core countries are Austria, 
Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Data for house prices are from Egert 
and Mihalik 2007 and EMF 2014, data for residential loans from EMF 2013. 
                                                 
 
3 The use of the terms European core and periphery has become more common in the wake of the 
Eurozone Crisis, acknowledging the fact that some European countries had been subject to much 
more destabilizing capital inflows than others. In line with this, I use the term ‘core countries’ for 
Europe’s North Western advanced capitalist countries and ‘peripheral countries’ for the East 
Central European and Southern European countries, as well as Ireland and Iceland.  
4 The data for mortgage debt are from EMF 2011, the data for public debt from Eurostat.  
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that mortgage and house price booms have been the strongest in East Central 
European countries, followed by Europe’s Western periphery. Compared to 
the periphery, core countries’ house price and mortgage lending increases seem 
rather moderate. 
Of course, the three country groups are not homogenous. Among the core 
countries, the UK had the highest house price and mortgage lending boom, and 
not all peripheral countries have experienced major lending booms. Figure 2 
further details mortgage lending in the sample of peripheral countries. Here, 
three groups of countries can be identified: The first group had already 
experienced a boom in mortgage debt during the 1990s – as witnessed by 
relatively high mortgage debt in 2002 – and still registered high growth rates 
during the first decade of the 21st century. Incidentally, these are all Western 
peripheral countries. A second group of countries started with almost no 
mortgage debt in 2002 and registered very high growth rates until 2008. These 
are mostly East Central European countries. Finally, the third group, made up 
of both Western and Eastern peripheral countries did not experience much 
increase in their mortgage debt over the 2000s. All in all, however, it is fair to 
say that a large majority of peripheral European countries experienced very 
high mortgage lending growth rates during the 2000s. 
As several recent studies have pointed out, the build-up of household debt is 
crucial to understanding the severity of the financial crisis (IMF 2012, Jordà et 
al. 2014, Glick and Lansing 2010, Mian and Sufi 2014). It is therefore not 
surprising that peripheral European countries, which encountered the highest 
build-up in mortgage debt, also experienced the steepest recessions. Against 
this background, it seems indeed somewhat misplaced that the EU’s post-crisis 
economic governance is mostly concerned with reining in public debt and 
restoring competitiveness, especially in Europe’s periphery. While the issues of 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
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housing and mortgage debt are not completely ignored, the EU’s focus is 
elsewhere. In this it mirrors the comparative capitalism literature, which by and 
Figure 2 
Residential Debt/GDP 
 
Source: EMF 2013. 
large looks at issues of public debt, and national institutions governing the 
manufacturing and public sector wage formation to explain the uneven 
repercussions of the GFC in Europe, and to define the needs of adaptation (e.g. 
Hassel 2014, Hall 2014, Johnston et al. 2014).5 
Despite the centrality of housing and housing finance in the GFC, the specific 
challenges of peripheral housing finance regimes have not yet been well 
understood. A small but growing literature that investigates the centrality of 
                                                 
 
5 But see Johnston and Reagan (2017) for an attempt at teasing out how labor market institutions 
influence house price inflation, and Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) and Stockhammer et al. (2016) 
for integrating issues of debt in their typologies of growth models.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2002 2008
Dorothee Bohle 
7 
housing and mortgage debt for contemporary capitalism provides an 
important starting point to the inquiry. Thus, in their pioneering work Herman 
Schwartz and Len Seabrooke (2009) point out that housing and the associated 
mortgage debt are “the single largest asset in people’s everyday lives and one 
of the biggest financial assets in most economies” (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2009: 1), and have important consequences for macroeconomic growth, social 
stability, welfare states, and political behaviour. Arguably, one of their most 
important contributions is the development of a typology of residential 
capitalism based on two dimensions: tenure types (owner occupation vs social 
rental), and mortgage markets (level of mortgage debt and liberalization of 
mortgage markets). They distinguish between four types of residential 
capitalism. The first, liberal market type is characterized by high levels of owner 
occupation, mortgage debt and liberal mortgage markets; and contrasts with 
the statist-developmentalist capitalism with low levels of owner occupation, 
mortgage debt, and highly controlled mortgage markets. The corporatist-market 
capitalism has low levels of home ownership but high levels of mortgage debt 
despite relatively controlled mortgage markets, whereas familial residential 
capitalism exhibits very high homeownership levels but low mortgage debt. 
Interestingly, all European peripheral countries considered by Schwartz and 
Seabrooke except for the Czech Republic cluster in the familial type of 
residential capitalism. Table 1 summarizes Schwartz and Seabrooke’s VoRC 
typology. 
Table 1 
Varieties of Residential Capitalism 
  Owner occupation rate 
Low High 
 
Mortgage as % of 
GDP 
High 
 
Corporatist market Liberal market 
Low 
 
Statist-developmentalist Familial 
Source: Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009: 10. 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
8 
While Schwartz and Seabrooke’s typology is crucial for understanding the 
starting point of peripheral (or familial) housing finance regimes, it does not 
provide an answer to the question of why it was these regimes that have 
experienced massive credit growth over the last two decades. To seek an 
answer, I turn to Manuel Aalbers’ and his co-authors’ work on the 
financialization of housing, which complements Schwartz and Seabrooke’s 
work (Aalbers 2008, 2016, Fernandez and Aalbers 2016, Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014). Financialization is defined as a process in which financial 
markets, institutions, actors and ideas gain increasing and transformative 
influence over the economy (Epstein 2005: 3, Aalbers 2016: 2). Building on 
heterodox analyses of financialization, Aalbers argues that in the last one to 
two decades, a “global wall of money” – a global pool of liquid capital that 
looks for investment opportunities – has been built up. The global wall of 
money results from the rise of accumulated corporate profits which are not 
being reinvested in the real economy or shared with workers; the recycling of 
trade surplus of export-oriented economies; and the privatization of pension 
schemes and build-up of funded pensions. Housing and mortgage debt, which 
are considered high quality collateral have absorbed an increasing amount of 
liquidity (Fernandez and Aalbers 2016, Schwartz 2009, Jordá et. al 2014). 
While privatization of housing, liberalization of finance and the wall of money 
have induced a common trend towards more financialized housing finance, 
these processes are filtered by national institutions and policies. Fernandez and 
Aalbers (2016) sketch four different trajectories. Not surprisingly, there is a 
strong affinity of these trajectories and the VoRC as identified by Schwartz and 
Seabrooke. Thus, somewhat simplified, Fernandez and Aalbers find that the 
liberal market and corporatist-market varieties have embraced financialization, 
while in the statist-developmentalist and familial varieties, the transformation 
of the housing and housing finance regimes have not yet reached the critical 
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point of financialization – that is, the increasing dominance of finance has not 
yet led to a systemic transformation of these regimes.6 Aalbers and Fernandez 
are, however, not concerned with building typologies but rather with 
identifying a set of trajectories of housing centered financialization.  
My paper will delve further in examining trajectories of housing centered 
financialization by focusing on the similarities and differences among the 
trajectories of peripheral – or familial – varieties of residential capitalism.7 In 
order to get at the specificities of the mortgage lending booms across Europe’s 
periphery, and to assess the post-crisis fate of financialization, this paper will 
build on VoRC’s insight that familial housing (finance) regimes are set apart, 
and combine this with digging deeper into the mechanisms of what Lapavitsas 
(2013) calls “subordinated financialization”, where peripheral countries are 
joining an increasingly financialized world economy while lacking the state 
power and capacities for shaping the processes of financialization. To this aim 
I study four cases that have experienced major mortgage and housing booms 
during the 2000s. My case selection includes two peripheral countries that 
according to Aalbers and Fernandez have crossed the threshold of housing 
financialization – Ireland and Iceland – and two that have not – Latvia and 
Hungary. These countries are also representative of the diversity of Europe’s 
peripheries. Located in Europe’s East and West, they are often considered to 
represent different varieties of capitalism, and are integrated in different ways 
in the European economy.  
                                                 
 
6 The country grouping, however, differs somewhat. For Fernandez and Aalbers, Iceland, Ireland 
and Spain are grouped together with the Anglo-Saxon countries that have embraced 
financialization, while the familial model is mostly populated by Mediterranean and East Central 
European peripheral countries.  
7 I use peripheral and familial housing regimes interchangeably. As will become clear in section 3, 
the reliance on family resources for housing finance is related to these countries’ peripheral late 
industrialization.  
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I seek to makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, I include the 
trajectories of East Central European housing finance in a debate which so far 
has mostly focused on the West. Second, I further explore specificities of 
peripheral financialization. Third, I analyze recent changes by studying the 
interaction of the transnational liberalization of finance and domestic housing 
and housing finance policies. This way, I open the “black box” of housing 
finance institutions and policies, and show how they have developed over time. 
Fourth, I do not only look at the build-up of the mortgage boom, but also ask 
how the GFC has affected housing finance in Europe’s periphery. 
 
3. Peripheral homeownership regimes meet transnational 
financial markets 
As Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) note, there are some features that set the 
European familial variety of residential capitalism apart from that of the 
advanced capitalist world. To put it in a pointed fashion: most European 
peripheral countries started their journeys in the world of transnational finance 
as debt-free or financially repressed high-homeownership societies. That is, while the 
owner-occupation rate in Europe’s periphery is significantly higher than in the 
core, mortgage debt has traditionally been much lower and/or mortgage 
lending has not been market based. Thus, homeownership rates in the 
periphery (in 2000) range from more than 75% in Portugal and Ireland to 
around 90% in Spain, Iceland, Hungary and Romania. Concomitantly, these 
countries have among the smallest rented sectors in Europe and virtually no 
social renting (Allen et al. 2004, Hegedüs 2013, Norris 2016, Sveinsson 2011). 
Under these conditions, large parts of the population have difficulties gaining 
access to housing as they cannot afford buying a home and have no choice of 
alternative tenure. 
Dorothee Bohle 
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Western peripheral societies’ status as high homeownership regimes predates 
the neoliberal turn towards private homeownership, even if it has still 
increased since the 1980s. While the reasons for the peculiar tenure structure 
differ across countries, there is a common thread, namely the role of late and 
limited industrialization and weak state capacity that is characteristic of the 
periphery. In core Europe, the promotion of a social rental sector aimed at 
accommodating the urban industrial labor force is associated with large public 
or co-operative ownership (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1988). In contrast, late and 
limited industrialization in the periphery decreased the pressure for 
accommodating masses of new city dwellers. At the same time, social relations 
originating in the countryside were more important for the development of 
housing regimes and their relations to welfare states than capital-labor 
relations. Thus, as Norris (2016) shows on the Irish example, agrarian politics 
and land distribution policies of the 19th century played a key role in the 
development of a highly subsidized and decommodified system of property 
redistribution which has been the backbone of the Irish welfare state.8 At the 
same time, the peripheral states often lacked the capacity to finance and 
manage a big rented sector (Allen et al. 2004: 166). It is true that many 
peripheral European countries launched major public housing programs after 
WWII. However, they were sooner or later sold to tenants, often at low prices. 
Promoting homeownership rather than social rentals was also a device to 
achieve social stability (Allen et al. 2004, Norris, 2016, Dellepiane et al. 2013).  
Remarkably, all these countries came to high homeownership via very limited 
mortgage markets. Norris (2016: 7) coined the term “socialized home 
ownership regime” for Ireland to denote that “most capital for home purchase 
                                                 
 
8 See also Allen et al. (2004) for the link between late industrialization, high homeownership and 
patchy welfare states in Southern Europe.  
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and construction came from the Irish government and many homeowner 
dwellings were also government constructed”. Versions of socialized home 
ownership regimes also were in place in Southern Europe and Iceland (Allen 
et al. 2004, Sveinsson 2011). Another way to put it is that until the 1980s even 
in those countries that made widespread use of mortgages, neither 
homeownership nor mortgage credit had been commodified.  
The East Central European road to high owner-occupation with limited 
mortgage markets was different. While East Central Europe (with the exception 
of Czechoslovakia) was industrializing late too, it achieved an industrial break-
through under state socialism. The communist ideology and its bureaucratic 
form of governance, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and heavy war 
destruction all implied that the state took a leading role in providing large scale 
housing after World War II. The high homeownership rates in Eastern Europe 
are therefore a direct result of transition policies after 1989. 9  Indeed, 
transferring the predominantly public housing stock into private hands was 
among the first steps undertaken by post-communist governments. The most 
common method to transfer the housing stock was to sell it to current 
occupants at low prices (Hegedüs 2013). In this sense it can be argued that their 
past as late industrializer caught up with post-communist Eastern Europe: after 
1989 private home-ownership was considered the norm, and large scale public 
housing stock a socialist aberration. At the same time, the neoliberal 
inclinations of most early transition governments in the region have further 
boosted the normative power of private home ownership, and international 
financial organizations, especially the World Bank, actively lobbied for fast 
privatization to individual tenants (Stephens et al. 2015). Another reason for 
                                                 
 
9 At the same time, most East Central European countries had institutionalized de facto home 
ownership already during socialism, and outside of the urban centers, self-help construction 
played an important role (Palacin et al. 2005) 
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fast privatization is that private housing acted as a “shock absorber”, making 
it easier for the population to cope with the shocks of transformation (Struyk 
1996 referred to in Hegedüs 2013: 38). Finally, fast privatization of public 
housing was to relieve the state from the burden of having to manage large 
housing stocks under the fiscal constraints of turbulent transition times.  
In East Central Europe, high ownership rates were achieved without the 
institutions and policies that are part of a private real estate market. Institutions 
such as land registries, consumer credit rating agencies, or property appraisal 
firms were non-existent, and property rights and their enforcement had to be 
established. Banks were still undergoing transition and many countries 
experienced banking crises. The absence of a functioning banking sector largely 
explains the very low levels of mortgage debt in East Central Europe in the 
early 2000 (see Figure 2).  
Thus, in Eastern Europe, as in peripheral Western Europe, high 
homeownership rates were achieved despite the absence of liberal mortgage 
markets. This made homeownership for new entrants very difficult. For 
southern Europe, the consequences are well established: young people leave 
their family homes at a very late age, and pooling family resources for 
acquiring a home is crucial (Allan et al. 2004) – hence, Schwartz and 
Seabrooke’s label of this variety of residential capitalism as familial. Eastern 
Europe exhibits a similar reliance on family resources for housing (Stephens et 
al. 2015).  
With transnational liberalization of the financial sector and the build-up of 
ample international liquidity, things however started to change. While the rise 
of global liquidity looking for investment opportunities had its origins in 
changes in the real economy, privatization of pensions, and the accumulation 
of global current account imbalances; it was the EU’s initiatives towards 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
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financial market integration which channeled an increasing share of it through 
banks to Europe’s periphery and specifically its mortgage markets. Most 
importantly, the Second Banking Directive, which entered into force in 1993, 
was a key driver of banking market integration, based on the principles of 
mutual recognition, minimum regulatory harmonization, and home country 
control. With this directive, European banks could establish branches and 
provide cross-border financial services in the EU and European Economic Area 
(EEA) (Decressin et. al 2007: 2). At the same time, the EU’s Directive on Own 
Funds and Solvency Ratio, which also took effect in 1993, “introduced a 
preferential weighting for residential loans and significantly increased the 
lenders’ ability to finance mortgage credit” (Whitehead et al. 2914: 10). Finally, 
the introduction of the euro eliminated the currency risk and pushed for further 
regulatory convergence. All of these initiatives fuelled cross-border lending, 
thus allowing the banks of peripheral states to escape their narrow deposit 
base, and made financing of mortgage credit much easier (ibid., Allen et al. 
2011: 22). In addition, interest rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB) for 
the whole eurozone made borrowing for peripheral states disproportionally 
cheap, often resulting in negative real interest rates (Honohan 2010: 11, Hay et 
al. 2008). 
This is the background against which most of the west European peripheral 
countries started to experience major mortgage lending booms from the 1990s 
onwards, and Eastern Europe joined during the 2000s. The remainder of this 
section will look in more detail at how the “wall of money” (Aalbers 2016) 
translated into mortgage and housing booms in Ireland, Iceland, Hungary and 
Latvia. Table 2 gives a snapshot view of their housing (finance) systems during 
the 2000s. The table shows that while all four countries have very high 
homeownership rates, they differ substantially in respect to the significance of 
a mortgage system. In Ireland and especially Iceland a significant share of 
Dorothee Bohle 
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homeowners has a mortgage, whereas this is only a tiny fraction in Hungary 
and Latvia. All four countries however experienced significant mortgage and 
housing booms. In addition, investment in housing experienced very high 
growth rates during the 2000s. 
Table 2 
Selected characteristics of housing (finance) systems before the crisis 
 Homeownership 
(2007) 
Owners with 
loans (2007) 
Outstanding 
residential 
loans (% of 
GDP, average 
annual change, 
2002-2008) 
Nominal 
house price 
increases 
(annual 
growth rate, 
2000-2007)  
Investment in 
Housing (real gross 
fixed investment, 
average annual 
change, 2000-2007 
(2005)) 
Latvia 86 7** 75 20* n.a. 
Hungary 89 15 68 15 5 (9) 
Iceland 84 71 48 14 12 (11) 
Ireland 78 33 25 10 7 (10) 
* 2002-2007 ** 2008 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2: EU-SILC. Column 3: EMF 2013. Column 4 and 5: EMF 2011. 
3.1 Mortgage booms in Ireland and Iceland 
Both Iceland and Ireland are infamous for the stellar rise of their banking 
sectors during the 2000s. In 2008, the banking systems’ total assets amounted 
to a staggering 800% of GDP in Iceland and close to 700% in Ireland (Eckholdt 
Christensen 2011: 116). In Ireland, the rapid growth of the banking sector was 
intrinsically linked to a property and mortgage boom. In Iceland, banks have 
been most famous for their international shopping spree. But also here, housing 
finance has played a major role.  
In both countries, the dismantling of the socialized home ownership regime 
(Norris 2016) combined with the liberalization and European integration of the 
banking sector led to unsustainable mortgage lending booms. In Ireland, a 
major crisis in the 1980s made the government turn away from publicly 
subsidizing homeownership. Instead, it began to deregulate mortgage finance. 
This allowed private banks to move into the market, replacing the earlier 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
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mortgage system dominated by mutual building societies and local 
governments (Dellepiane et. al 2013, Kelly and Everett 2004, Norris and Coates 
2014, Norris 2016).  
From 2003 on, Irish banks started to rely heavily on interbank lending not only 
from the euro area, but also the US and UK (Honohan 2010, Lane 2015). Figure 
3 shows the development of foreign claims of BIS reporting banks for all four 
countries since 1994. Before the crisis there has been a rapid increase of foreign 
claims everywhere, but the levels differ: in Ireland and Iceland the claims have 
reached above 300% of GDP and in Hungary and Latvia around 100% of GDP.10 
Figure 3 also shows the sudden stop of foreign claims once the crisis hit, a 
development I will return to later in the paper. 
Figure 3 
Consolidated Foreign Claims of BIS Reporting Banks (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Worldbank and BIS Global Financial Development Database, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-development-database 
                                                 
 
10 Not all of Ireland’s cross border lending was channeled into the housing market. Ireland’s 
high level of foreign claims is closely linked to its position as an offshore financial center, which 
it has developed since 1987 (Tax Justice Network, 11/11/2015).  
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The established Irish banks also faced fierce competition by new foreign 
entrants that started to expand aggressively – most infamously Anglo-Irish 
Bank. Competition as well as a pronounced lack of regulation fostered reckless 
lending practices (Dellepiane et al. 2013, Lane 2015). Policy makers did little to 
rein in risky lending practices. Rather, “[i]n the Irish case, the issue was a naïve 
and uncritical acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, and excessive trust 
on the part of the policy-makers in government, the Central Bank, and the 
Financial Regulator’s office, that the banks knew best how to run their own 
business. They explicitly sought to emulate the British practice of light-touch 
… But in effect, light regulation meant no regulation” (Dellepiane et al. 2013: 
30). It was only in 2003 that the Irish Financial Service Regulatory Agency was 
established, and its independence from the Central Bank as well as the shortage 
of skilled staff made it an utterly useless agency (Barnes and Wren 2012). The 
government, in turn, fueled the housing boom by tax incentives. Arguably, the 
Irish property and housing boom was greatly enhanced by a cozy relationship 
between the main banks, politicians of the ruling Fianna Fáil party, and 
developers; a relationship that dates back to the earlier phase of the social home 
ownership regime (Dellepiane et. al 2013, McDonald and Sheridan 2008).  
In comparison to Ireland, Iceland was a latecomer both in terms of banking and 
mortgage deregulation. The seeds of Iceland’s ultra-liberal finance regime were 
however also sown in the 1980s, when a radical neoliberal faction emerged 
within the ruling Independence Party. The end of the Cold War swept a 
prominent member of that faction, Davíð Oddson, to power. He was Prime 
Minister from 1991-2004, and subsequently became Governor of the Central 
Bank. It was under his leadership that the Icelandic financial sector was 
unleashed. The first crucial step was Iceland’s accession to the EEA, which 
lifted restrictions on cross-border capital flows. Bank privatization followed 
suit, with the two large state banks – Landsbanki and Búnaðarbanki (later to 
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become Kaupþing) privatized to loyal supporters of the Independence and the 
Center Party, respectively (Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir 2010: 12). A third bank, 
Glitnir, was the result of a merger of several smaller banks, controlled by the 
nouveaux riche Ásgeir family. Privatization and deregulation enabled 
investment banks to enter the commercial banking markets, gain access to 
consumer deposits, and resulted in a heavily concentrated banking sector (ibid, 
Schwartz 2011).  
The newly privatized banks soon began to expand into the mortgage market, 
hitherto dominated by the government backed Housing Financing Fund (HFF), 
which “provided a steady if limited flow of credit through simple, vanilla 
mortgages. Interest rates tended to be below market European rates, but loan 
to value ratios were capped at 65–70 per cent” (Schwartz 2011: 296). Banks 
started to offer more attractive loans, and competition over mortgage provision 
started in earnest when the government relaxed the rules for mortgage lending 
in 2004. From then on, Icelandic homeowners faced increasingly favourable 
borrowing conditions. The newly privatized banks out-competed each other 
and the HFF by offering housing loans with 90% of the purchase price or more, 
longer maturities, and lower interest rates. The option of refinancing loans gave 
homeowners the possibility to withdraw some of the home equity, and to lower 
their repayment costs by taking new loans with more favourable conditions. 
Banks also aggressively pushed homeowners to convert existing or take out 
new loans in foreign currencies, mostly Swiss franc and Japanese yen, in order 
to take advantage of the lower interest rates. In 2008, 15% of all mortgages were 
foreign currency denominated (Mendez Pinedo and Domurath 2015: 103). As 
in Ireland, the rapidly increasing availability of cheap credit fueled a house 
price boom (Benediktsdóttir et al. 2011, Sveinsson 2011, Hart-Landsberg 2013, 
Schwartz 2011, Viken 2011).  
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As is well known, not only did Icelandic banks lend recklessly at home, they 
pursued even more reckless practices abroad. Arguably, the Icelandic elites 
bought even more into the idea of light touch regulation than their Irish 
counterparts. Iceland’s financial supervision was fragmented between three 
government departments, the Central Bank, and the Financial Supervisory 
Authority, which had no functioning cooperation. Even if they had wanted to, 
it is highly doubtful whether they had the professional skill to exercise 
supervisory authority (Viken 2011). 
 
3.2 Mortgage booms in Hungary and Latvia11 
For Hungary and Latvia, the most important trigger for mortgage lending has 
been these countries’ deep transnational financial integration that went hand 
in hand with their EU accession. The combination of convergence on the 
institutional and regulative standards of the European financial area, the 
privatization of the banking sector, and the liberalization of capital movements, 
all of which were part of EU’s entry requirements, allowed these countries to 
catch up fast in financial matters (e.g. Enoch and Ötker-Robe 2007, Mitra et al. 
2010, Pistor 2009). Perhaps most notable is the high share of foreign ownership 
of their banking sector, a development fostered by the EU which saw in foreign 
banks a guarantee for a sound banking system. From the early 2000s onwards, 
Austrian, Italian and Swedish banks moved into Eastern Europe. In the mid-
2000s, the share of foreign banks was more than 82% in Hungary, and above 
60% in Latvia. 12  In the Hungarian market, a fierce competition between 
Austrian, Italian and the former domestic savings bank, OTP, took off. While 
the overall share of foreign banks in Latvia was smaller, Nordic banks, above 
                                                 
 
11 Some of this subsection draws on Bohle 2014. 
12 http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/global-financial-development-database 
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all two rival Swedish banking groups – SEB and Swedbank – dominate the 
residential banking market (Zubkova et al. 2003). Latvian banks in domestic 
ownership overwhelmingly manage non-residential capital, mostly of Russian 
origin (Eglitis et. al 2014).  
Foreign banks were instrumental in developing the hitherto almost non-
existing mortgage markets. They brought expertise in mortgage lending from 
their home countries and could easily tap into foreign sources of credit 
expansion, usually through borrowing from their parent banks. This is 
reflected in the increase of foreign claims (see Figure 3). In both countries, 
foreign banks issued loans denominated in foreign currencies, mostly Swiss 
francs in the Hungarian case and euros in Latvia. Taking advantage of the 
ECB’s expansionary monetary policy in 2004-2007, banks engaged in large scale 
carry trade of cheap international credit (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 29). 
In 2008, more than 85% of loans were denominated in foreign currency in 
Latvia, and more than 70% in Hungary (Mak and Pales 2009, Blanchard et. al 
2013: 333). For consumers, foreign currency loans were attractive because of the 
favourable interest rates.  
Governments mostly acted in collusion with banks to create more liquid (and 
inherently riskier) mortgage markets. In Hungary, the first national-
conservative government under Premier Viktor Orbán (1998-2002) adopted a 
program for generously subsidized housing loans, and grants for young 
families to build or buy houses. In addition, people who took a housing loan 
also received income tax exemption (Rózsavölgyi and Kovács 2005). The 
continuous expansion of the program, however, turned out to be financially 
unviable, and was phased out from 2003 (Hegedüs 2011: 119). It is from this 
moment on that foreign currency lending really took off. As demand for 
housing remained very high, low interest rate Swiss franc lending provided a 
Dorothee Bohle 
21 
substitute for publicly subsidized mortgage lending (Committee on 
Constitution, Justice, and Standing Order of the Hungarian Parliament 2012). 
A very liberal financial environment and intense competition among banks 
fueled increasingly risky lending practices (Banai et al. 2012, Józon 2015). Even 
though the Hungarian National Bank, the Financial Supervisory Authority and 
the IMF issued warnings about the foreign currency exposure, Hungarian 
politicians remained passive on the issue (Bohle 2014).  
In Latvia, before the large-scale entry of foreign banks, mortgage lending was 
scarce and expensive, with interest rates between 12-14%. In 2000, the Berzins 
government adopted the first stage of a housing lending development program 
which aimed at encouraging the purchase or renovation of dwellings via 
subsidized mortgages (Osa 2005: 200). Similar to Hungary, commercial banks’ 
foreign currency lending soon overtook publicly subsidized lending (Henilane 
2015: 2). Foreign currency lending seemed a somewhat more natural choice in 
Latvia than in Hungary. In the early 1990s, Latvia, as a newly independent 
state, settled on a fixed exchange rate to signal the credibility of its new 
currency to financial markets. It initially pegged the currency to the Special 
Drawing Rights, and in 2000 to the euro. Latvian governments were also firmly 
committed to joining the euro (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Latvia’s currency 
peg, limited monetary autonomy, capital convertibility and informal 
euroization combined to trigger a major lending and mortgage boom. During 
the 2000s, Latvia became one of the most financialized economies in East 
Central Europe. Its growth model relied almost entirely on investment in 
banking, real estate, and construction (Becker et al. 2010, Bohle and Greskovits 
2012). Finance-led growth spurred high inflation rates, and given that Latvia’s 
Central Bank could not use interest rates to rein in inflation, borrowing became 
increasingly cheaper (Blanchard et al. 2013: 333). Tax policies further 
contributed to the boom: Latvia did not levy any property tax on residential 
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buildings or capital gains taxes (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 29). No small 
wonder that Latvians took out increasing mortgage loans to buy ever more 
expensive homes.  
As in Hungary, the IMF and the Central Bank started issuing warnings about 
the unsustainability of the lending boom (IMF 2006, interview 6) from the mid-
2000s onwards. However, neither regulators nor politicians seemed to be 
particularly concerned, while banks even stepped up their aggressive lending 
behaviour (Interview 2 and 3, Bukeviciute and Kosicki 2012: 5). Given the fierce 
competition, banks also saw their hands tied. At the height of the boom, the 
head of the banking association and the Central Bank asked policy makers for 
more stringent regulation. Policy makers rejected this request on the grounds 
that tougher regulation would constitute “state capture” (Interview 1 and 4). 
Indeed, the government had no interest in curbing excessive lending. It 
profited from the budgetary income that exuberant growth brought about by 
engaging in expansionary fiscal policies (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011, 
Rimšēvičs 2010).  
 
3.3 Summary 
This section has identified several similarities but also differences in the build-
up of the mortgage booms in peripheral Europe. Differences in EU integration 
– EMU membership, EU membership, or membership of the European 
Economic Area – do not seem to imply systematic difference in terms of the 
mechanisms that have offset the lending booms. In all four countries, EU 
induced external liberalization and domestic policies of deregulation and 
privatization of the banking sector has channeled dominantly international 
liquidity into mortgage finance. Borrowing in euro reduced the costs of credit 
significantly for Ireland, as the ECB set interest rates with a view of the whole 
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eurozone and not its peripheral, inflation prone members.13 However, non-
EMU members found functional equivalents, namely borrowing in foreign 
currency denominated loans. In all cases, peripheral countries could thus 
piggyback on interest rates set for much less inflation prone economies.  
Integration in European financial markets – whether as EMU, EU or EEA 
member – allowed all four countries to escape the narrow confines of their 
domestic financial markets. International finance of emerging mortgage 
markets has taken two forms: in Ireland and Iceland, banks relied strongly on 
wholesale markets while in Latvia and Hungary, direct foreign bank 
penetration and the financing of local affiliates through their parent banks 
played a key role. These differences notwithstanding, both forms have led to 
excessively leveraged banking systems and extensive maturity mismatches, as 
short-term funds borrowed in markets abroad were invested in long term 
mortgages (Schwartz 2011). The four countries were not entirely stripped of 
regulatory instruments to circumvent the systemic danger inherent in this. 
Rather, governments and supervisory authorities were either unwilling or 
unable (and typically both) to curb foreign borrowing and domestic lending, 
and hedge against the risks. However, as much of the literature on the GFC 
points out, systemic banking risks have been largely ignored in the run up to 
the crisis. Anecdotal evidence shows that EU financial authorities 
underestimated the lending booms’ systemic risks (Bakker and Gulde 2010: 27-
29, European Court of Auditors 2015).  
                                                 
 
13 Of course, the flip side of the ECB’s one-size-fits-all interest rate, which generated negative real 
interest rates in Ireland, is its dampening effect on the low inflation economies, such as Germany, 
exerting further pressure on domestic consumption. This reinforces the export orientation of 
northern capitalism, generating additional liquidity that could be channeled into the periphery 
(Scharpf 2011).  
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The high dependence on foreign borrowing proved to be the Achilles heel of 
the housing finance systems. The next section will explore how the crisis has 
exposed the hierarchical nature of peripheral financialization, and how 
governments in the four countries have responded to the crisis of (mortgage) 
finance. 
 
4. The mortgage boom turns bust: crisis and crisis 
management  
Table 3 provides a snapshot view on the exposure of the Latvian, Hungarian, 
Icelandic and Irish populations and banks to the housing and mortgage crisis. 
It reveals that while the depth and mix of the exposure differs across the four 
countries, in all cases households have faced increasing risks of over-
indebtedness related to rising unemployment and decreasing house prices, and 
in three cases they also faced significant exposure to exchange rate risks. All of 
this has resulted in a ballooning of non-performing loans, threatening the 
stability of the banking sector. The latter was further endangered by the high 
share of foreign debt that banks had accumulated, as shown in column 5.  
The banking systems were adversely affected by the financial turmoil from 
2008 onwards. All four countries experienced sudden stops of capital inflows, 
resulting in sharp recessions (Berthaud and Colliaque 2010, Gross and Alcidi 
2013, see also Figure 3), and when the sudden stops turned into liquidity or 
solvency crises of their banks, Europe’s peripheral countries learned who the 
“ultimate guardian” of their transnationally integrated financial systems was 
(Pistor 2009). In none of the four countries was the national central bank able 
to act as lender of last resort. All four countries had to turn to the IMF and/or 
EU to get access to much needed liquidity, and these organizations coordinated 
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the processes and set the terms for restructuring the financial systems. The 
terms differed, and governments faced tough decisions whether to comply 
with the conditionality, or risk being shut off from international markets 
altogether.14 
Table 3 
Household and bank exposure to the crisis, 2008-2010 
 Mortgage 
debt/GDP 
(in %, 
2009) 
Nominal 
house price 
(annual % 
change, 
2008-2010) 
Non- 
performing 
household 
loans 
(2010) 
Share of 
foreign 
currency 
loans in total 
loans to 
households 
(2008) 
Foreign 
claims of 
BIS 
reporting 
banks  
(% of GDP, 
2008) 
Exchange 
rate 
Unemploy
-ment 
(2008 
->2010) 
Latvia 37 - 47 ↗ 17 ↗ 85 94 peg 8->20 
Hungary 24 - 12 ↘ 11 ↗ 70 97 (managed) 
float 
6->7 
Ireland 92 - 24 ↘↘ 7 ↗↗ n.a. 338 euro 6->14 
Iceland 119* - 15 ↗ 20 ↘ 15 187 float 3->7 
* 2007 
Sources: Column 1 & 2: EMF: Hypostat 2013. ↘ denotes a further fall, ↘↘ a rapid further fall of house 
prices, and ↗ an increase of house prices. Column 2: Hungary: share of loans in arrears over 90 days in the 
household loans portfolio, EMF 2011: Study on non-performing loans in the EU, Latvia: share of overdue 
(>90 days) loans in housing loans portfolio, SEB Baltic Household Outlook 2014, Ireland: non performing 
mortgage loans as a share of total mortgage loans, Bank of Ireland, quoted in Schoenmaker 2015: 16, Iceland 
NPL as a percentage of total loans granted to households by largest banks and HFF, Financial Stability 
Report 2012, 2: 23. ↘ denotes a decreasing, ↗ an increasing, and ↗↗ a rapidly increasing trend. Column 4: 
Hungary: National Bank of Hungary (2009, figure 2/17), Latvia Blanchard et al 2013: 333, Iceland: Mendez 
Pinedo and Domurath 2015: 103, Column 5 World Bank, Global Financial Development Database, Column 
7: Eurostat. 
Below I explore how the four countries negotiated the international constraints, 
choices and trade-offs that they faced once the crisis broke out, and how these 
have shaped the housing finance regimes. 
 
                                                 
 
14 Once the “fast burning” phase of the crisis was over, peripheral housing finance regimes also 
became increasingly shaped by international policies emerging as a response to the crisis (for the 
concepts of fast and slow burning crises see Callon 1998 and Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014). Macro-
prudential regulation and the EU’s Mortgage Credit Directive, which was adopted in 2014, are 
likely to have an important impact on mortgage lending. This paper does not explore this impact 
systematically.  
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4.1 Hungary and Iceland: rejecting financialization 
4.1.1 Hungary 
Hungary turned to the IMF when its banking sector faced a liquidity crisis 
resulting from the turmoil in the foreign currency swap market (Aslund and 
Dombrovksis 2011). Its crisis response evolved in two distinct phases. The first 
phase was overshadowed by the conditions of the IMF stand-by agreement 
signed in autumn 2008, and the fear that foreign banks would pull out from the 
region.15 By 2008 a debate erupted about the exposure of foreign parent banks 
in the region and many observers were persuaded that Western banks would 
cut their losses and run (Epstein 2014). In this situation, the socialist 
administration of Gordon Bajnai (2009-2010) showed little appetite for taking 
on the banks. Rather, it signed the so-called Vienna Initiative, a series of accords 
signed by several East Central European states with ten major European banks 
and the IMF to maintain the presence of exposed banks. In the agreements, 
parent banks committed to support their subsidiaries in the region, roll-over 
their credits, and capitalize them adequately. In those countries that had stand-
by agreements with the IMF, banks made their commitment dependent on their 
host governments’ compliance (Pistor 2011). Under these conditions, the 
housing question was not a priority for the government. It rather saw as its 
most urgent tasks to rein in the public debt and deficit, as defined by the IMF 
stand-by agreement signed in autumn 2008.  
As the crisis unfolded, the question of foreign currency loans however became 
increasingly pressing. After the Hungarian Central Bank had scrapped the 
currency band in 2008 and let the forint float, the latter massively depreciated 
                                                 
 
15 In November 2008, the IMF approved a €12.5 billion loan to Hungary to support weathering the 
crisis. The IMF-supported economic program had two key objectives: fiscal consolidation and the 
stabilization of the financial sector. This was part of a broader IMF-World Bank and EU 
administered loan of €20 billion in total (Lütz and Kranke 2014).  
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against the Swiss franc, leaving forex indebted homeowners in dire straits. By 
2012, Swiss franc mortgage holders faced a 60% increase of their debt service 
due to the exchange rate alone (IMF 2012: 19). This is the background of the 
second phase of crisis response under Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ government. 
Soon after coming to power in 2010, Orbán declared Hungary’s fight for 
independence from “a world symbolized by banks, multinationals and a 
bullying IMF” (Oszkó 2012). In the fight’s course, Hungary severed its ties with 
the IMF. It paid back its stand-by loan in full and well in advance and 
consequently asked the IMF to close its Budapest office. The government also 
sought to alleviate the burdens for households with foreign currency loans. In 
2011, it introduced the possibility to exchange foreign currency loans in forint 
at a preferential exchange rate for debtors who could repay their debt at one 
stroke, and introduced an exchange rate protection mechanism, where 
repayments are calculated at an advantageous fixed exchange rate. In late 2014, 
finally, the government forced almost all debtors to swap their forex loans into 
local currency at the then current rate. This step indeed saved many households 
from a financial ruin, as it occurred just before a major appreciation of the Swiss 
franc in early 2015 (Bogler 2015).  
In addition to dealing with the forex loans, the government also imposed 
special taxes on banks, insurance companies and other financial services. These 
taxes, levied from 2009 onwards, were eventually lowered in 2015. In turn, 
credit institutions had to pledge to increase lending to the corporate sector, 
especially SMEs, rather than to households (Portfolio.hu, 21/5/2015). 
Furthermore, in 2014, legislation also took on unfair banking practices, which 
forced banks to pay significant compensation to indebted households (IMF 
2016a: 44). The government also introduced a temporary moratorium on the 
repossession of homes whose owners were lagging behind with their mortgage 
payments. This moratorium was extended several times and it was lifted only 
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in 2016. As banks were until then only allowed to designate a tiny fraction of 
homes in their non-performing loans (NPL) portfolio for sale, their balance 
sheets deteriorated. These measures have curtailed the capacity of banks to 
lend to households (ibid.)  
All taken together, the national-conservative government in Hungary has used 
its two-thirds majority to redesign central elements of the Hungarian housing 
finance system in the context of a deep economic and social crisis. Its overtly 
nationalistic and anti-finance-capital discourse aims at pitting vulnerable 
households against foreign banks, thereby generating support for its 
interventionist policies among all strata of society. Its interventionist policies 
have pushed much of the costs of the various support schemes on banks rather 
than tax payers. The explicit objective of a Magyarized banking system 
indicates that its financial system will be significantly altered, at least 
concerning the ownership structure and mortgage finance (Johnson and Barnes 
2015). Yet, these unorthodox policy responses have also contributed to the 
return of the traditional woes of its housing regime. Mortgage finance has 
become a rare good, housing construction is only slowly recovering, and 
people are once again stuck to their homes. A newly developed system of 
publicly subsidized mortgages for families with children has not substantially 
altered this picture (see Table 4 below). 
4.1.2 Iceland 
Iceland, as Schwartz (2011: 299) writes, “came late to the global party, drank 
too quick and hit the floor rather harder than larger economies”. When the 
crisis erupted, the tiny country found itself with a hugely over-leveraged 
banking sector and population, and overvalued property prices. As Schwartz 
argues, “leveraging up without a reserve currency is a titanic mistake” (ibid: 
292). Its banks were indeed too big to be saved, and in contrast to Hungary, 
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where parent companies of banks were ready to take major losses, in the 
Icelandic case, British and Dutch depositors insisted on guarantees. Iceland had 
to turn to the IMF for emergency lending, which, together with the Nordic 
Central Banks also contributing to the bailout, administered the usual austerity 
medicine.16 The IMF also backed the British and Dutch governments’ demand 
that Iceland compensates them for bailing out the Icesave depositors. Crisis and 
austerity triggered a wave of social unrest, which succeeded in ousting the 
government. During the protests, debt-write down emerged as one of the 
central demands (IMF 2012: 106). As in Hungary, homeowners who had 
borrowed in foreign currencies were particularly hard hit by the devaluation 
of the Iceland krona, which depreciated around 60% in the wake of the crisis.  
In April 2009, a Social Democratic-Green coalition government came to power, 
for the first time in the country’s history. This government took a number of 
policy actions that were quite different from those of other hard-hit states. 
“Most importantly, rather than trying to resuscitate existing structures and 
patterns of economic activity through austerity measures, it actively intervened 
in financial, currency and housing markets, as well as strengthened targeted 
social programs that protected majority interests” (Hart-Landsberg 2013: n.p.). 
In terms of housing policies, the government adopted a number of measures 
fast in order to prevent over-indebted homeowners from losing their homes. 
These included “a moratorium on foreclosure, a temporary suspension of debt 
service for exchange rate- and CPI-indexed loans, and rescheduling (payment 
soothing) of these loans.” (IMF 2012: 106). These measures reduced current 
debt service payments significantly (up to 40% for those with foreign exchange 
or indexed loans). In addition to the government, the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
 
16  The IMF and Nordic countries together offered a $4.6 billion loan to Iceland (Wade and 
Sigurgeirsdóttir 2012: 22). 
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played a major role in dealing with the legacy of foreign currency loans. In 2010, 
it ruled that foreign currency indexation had not been in line with existing laws 
and loans had to be recalculated (Méndez Pinedo and Domurath 2015: 112).  
The government also created an Office of the Debtor’s Ombudsman, which 
negotiated, on behalf of debtors, debt restructuring out of court. In 2012, a debt 
forgiveness plan was introduced which writes down underwater mortgages 
(IMF 2012: 107). In addition, the government subsidized a large share of 
mortgage interests for a period of up to two years, and offered a means-tested 
tax rebate on interest payments (Ólafsson 2011: 20). Most of these measures 
relieved above all vulnerable social groups, such as low income households 
and families with children. They did not target homeowners with negative 
equity or those who had bought more extravagant property.  
Some more fundamental changes in the housing system have also been on the 
agenda. According to Ólafsson (2011: 20), the government has put special effort 
into developing, together with NGOs and local authorities, alternative tenure 
models to homeownership. Indeed, the homeownership rate has decreased by 
11% since its peak in 2005 from 87% to 78% in 2014 (see Table 4 below).  
A substantial part of the costs of loan restructuring was “born indirectly by 
foreign creditors, who took significant losses when the banks collapsed” (IMF 
2012: 107). As to future mortgage lending, a number of initiatives point to a 
more restrictive environment. A new Act on Consumer Loans, based on the EU 
mortgage directive, which entered into force in 2013, aims to promote 
“responsible lending”. It requires lenders to assess borrower’s creditworthiness 
carefully before granting a loan and to provide detailed information about the 
conditions of the loan. An assessment of the consequences of the act comes to 
the conclusion that it will most likely make borrowing for low income families 
with children more difficult. The HFF reported a decline of 25% in approved 
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credit assessment after the directive entered into force (Bank of Iceland 2014: 
71). Another step concerns the abolition of indexed consumer loans which has 
started in 2016. Although the changes are being implemented over a longer 
period, they also predict a more restrictive credit supply (ibid).  
All in all, as Iceland was to discover in the crisis, there was no ultimate 
guardian that was able or willing to keep a lifeline for its massively 
overleveraged banks. What is more, when Landsbanki, and with it Icesave, 
collapsed, a diplomatic tug-of-war started about who ought to compensate the 
British and Dutch depositors for their losses. The British and Dutch authorities 
asked for a sovereign guarantee for their countries’ depositors, and the “Icesave 
dispute” overshadowed the country’s attempt to negotiate EU membership 
(Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir 2011, FT, 29/1/2013). The collapse of the banks, their 
nationalization, and the tightening of lending conditions imposed severe 
restraints on mortgage lending. It is not entirely clear how long this restrictive 
financial environment will last. On the one hand, the government has 
privatized two of the new banks, is in the process of increasing the private share 
for the third, and lifted its capital controls (IMF 2017). On the other hand, the 
old political forces associated with Iceland’s financialization were able to make 
a comeback in the 2013 and 2016 parliamentary elections. 
 
4.2 Ireland and Latvia: accepting financialization 
4.2.1 Ireland 
Pundits and the media alike often depict Iceland’s crisis management as the 
polar opposite of Ireland’s. While Iceland let its banks go bust, Ireland saved 
them at enormous costs. While Iceland’s economy profited from the substantial 
devaluation of the krona, Ireland had to accept the straightjacket of EMU and 
pursue internal devaluation. While Iceland pushed some of the costs of the 
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crisis onto foreigners, Ireland had to internalize the costs to save German and 
French bondholders. Although some of the crisis response was related to 
domestic choices, Ireland’s EMU membership weighed hard on the country’s 
options.  
In 2008, the Irish government reacted to large losses in the banking sector by 
issuing a blanket guarantee of the liabilities of all troubled banks, and 
subsequently by injecting massive capital into the banking sector and by 
nationalizing its banks. The guarantee was, as O’Toole (2010, quoted in Mair 
2011: 3) put it, “the most momentous political decision in the history of the 
state”. As a result, public deficit and debt soared and Ireland had to turn to the 
Troika of the EU, IMF and ECB for emergency lending to avert a sovereign 
default.17 Thus, for Ireland the Troika turned into the ultimate guardian of its 
troubled banks and set harsh conditions for the rescue. The most contentious 
and weighty condition was that Ireland had to bailout senior bond holders. It 
was the ECB that insisted on this to prevent crisis contagion in the Eurozone. 
In contrast, the IMF wanted a senior bondholder bail-in for Ireland 
(Schoenmaker 2015, European Court of Auditors 2015, The Irish Times, 
8/2/2014).18  
The massive austerity that has followed the bank guarantee and the EU-IMF 
bailout has led to a veritable crisis in housing and housing finance. Non-
performing loans soared and the Troika pushed Ireland for a tougher eviction 
legislation (Irish Times, 11/12/2012). In this context, it is not surprising that 
Ireland – together with Latvia – is one of the few EU countries in which the 
number of evictions have increased between 2010 and 2013 (Kenna et al. 2016). 
                                                 
 
17 The loan totaled some €66 billion (European Court of Auditors 2015: 17).  
18 According to the Irish Times, the president of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, also supported 
a bail-in for senior bondholders. This challenges the assumption that Germany insisted on 
taxpayers paying for the Irish banks (The Irish Times, 8/2/2014; 24/1/2014).  
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However, the absolute number of repossessions remains relatively low, mostly 
because banks have not been eager to foreclose the property, as this step might 
have resulted in real losses and brought the undercapitalization of banks into 
the open (Phillips 2013). By 2013, a lively debate broke out about a supposedly 
large share of strategic defaulters among indebted borrowers. According to 
some, up to 35% of mortgage arrears is due to people preferring to spend their 
money on other things than servicing their debt (Independent, 14/8/2913). This 
discourse is to justify harsher treatments of indebted homeowners.  
Social housing also suffered during the crisis. Although it has been neglected 
for decades, the remaining meager budget was further retrenched in 2008-2014 
(Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government 2014). It 
is only in 2014 that the government has outlined a new strategy towards social 
housing. Most of the support, however, is not dedicated to public social 
housing, but rather subsidizes rental payments. This dovetails a more 
substantial change in the Irish housing regime, namely the rise of private 
rentals. Already before the boom, the Irish mortgage providers have issued an 
increasing number of buy-to-let mortgages (Norris 2016). In 2011 almost one in 
five families lived in private rentals and the proportion in cities is even higher 
(Threshold 2014: 3). The increased share of renting is due to three factors: first, 
before the crisis, the house price boom made it very difficult for first time 
buyers to find affordable housing, while it allowed wealthier segments of the 
population to accumulate housing property. Second, the private rental sector 
compensates for the absence of a social housing sector, and third, the crisis has 
made homeownership unaffordable for an increasing number of people. What 
this all amounts to is that housing wealth is becoming distributed increasingly 
unequally across the population.  
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Overall, it is evident that in contrast to both Hungary and Iceland, Ireland’s 
approach to the mortgage crisis has been mostly concerned with saving its 
banks. The blanket guarantee for the liabilities of all troubled banks was a 
decision made entirely by the domestic ruling party, while later policies have 
been designed under the influence of the “Troika”. Given the size of the 
housing and mortgage debt problems after the crisis, the government has been 
remarkably abstinent in its policy making. A law for debt restructuring has 
only been drafted in 2012 and a new policy for social housing in 2014. 
Meanwhile, housing prices in Ireland (especially Dublin) have been on the rise. 
Regan (2016: n.p.) explains this with the fact that banks are not interested in a 
rise of housing supply, as this “would reduce prices and expose the underlying 
debt dynamics of the bank’s balance sheet”. 
4.2.2 Latvia 
Latvia’s policy response to its banking and mortgage crisis has been most 
similar to that of Ireland. Its immediate policy response was overshadowed by 
the run on its biggest domestic bank, PAREX. In response to the run, the 
government took over the majority control for a symbolic price. The costs of 
recapitalizing and the need for restructuring PAREX were the major reasons 
why the Latvian government turned to the IMF in 2008 (Aslund and 
Dombrovskis 2011: 35). At the same time, Latvia’s currency came under 
tremendous pressure. The major focus of the IMF-EU-Nordic bailout package 
were macroeconomic aspects of the crisis, including the exchange rate. 19  
A crucial policy decision of the Latvian government was to avoid devaluation 
of the lats and instead prepare for euro entry. This was a very controversial 
                                                 
 
19 Latvia’s IMF-EU-Nordic countries loan was €7.5 billion, 40% of its GDP (European Court of 
Auditors 2015: 17). For a thorough discussion of the loan and conditionality, see also Lütz and 
Kranke (2014).  
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decision: a number of internationally renowned economists and also the IMF 
team suggested that Latvia abandon its currency peg to regain competitiveness. 
At the same time, the European Commission and the Swedish Government 
took a different stance, a position that ultimately prevailed (Lütz and Kranke 
2014). The Latvian government’s decision not to devalue was, however, not the 
result of international pressure. Bank of Latvia’s governor, Ilmārs Rimšēvičs, 
was an adamant defender of the currency peg. For him, “devaluation is not a 
medicine, but poison” (quoted after Interview 5, see also Rimšēvičs 2010). The 
government followed suit, and there was very little public discussion about the 
issue, with the few dissenting voices quickly being silenced.20 
There were many reasons for the government and Central Bank to stick to the 
currency peg (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011: 51-54). One crucial aspect 
certainly was that a devaluation of the lats would have inflicted heavy losses 
on the exposed Swedish banks, which explains the Swedish position on 
devaluation (Becker and Jäger 2010). Instead, however, the cost of adaptation 
was pushed onto the population. The adjustment program was tough even by 
IMF standards, and the government stayed on course to achieve an early 
repayment of the bailout loan and EMU membership. In fact, it often 
outstripped the austerity requirements set by the international organizations 
(Eihmanis 2017). The severity of Latvia’s austere adjustment was one of the 
major reasons for over-indebtedness. Unemployment soared while wages 
decreased. These negative income shocks had detrimental consequences on 
Latvian households’ capacities to service their debt, as manifest in an increase 
of non-performing housing loans (Rudzītis 2014, Table 3).  
                                                 
 
20  One journalist who publicly advocated devaluation was jailed, and an economist voicing a 
dissenting opinion was called in by the Central Bank to explain himself (Interview 5).  
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The government did little to help over-indebted homeowners. Under the 
pressure of banks, and also because mortgages were mostly held by more 
affluent segments of the population, the government decided against public 
support for household debt restructuring (Erbenova et al. 2011: 16). Instead, it 
sought to strengthen the framework for market-based forms. Hence, it was 
banks that were restructuring loans, typically, however, without reducing the 
overall value of the debt (ibid: 11). In addition, the government has 
strengthened the framework for voluntary out-of-court debt restructuring and 
the personal bankruptcy regime, which now allows responsible debtors a fresh 
start at the end of the insolvency procedure (ibid: 18). In addition to these 
measures focusing on individual debtors, the government also strengthened 
the supervisory framework of banks.  
Market-based debt restructuring has led to a significant amount of evictions 
and repossessions. By 2010, 18% of all loans to households were in “workout” 
– i.e. banks were in the process of foreclosing on collateral (Erbenova et al. 2011: 
20). Like Ireland, Latvia is among the few EU member states where evictions 
were on the rise between 2010 and 2013. The highest increase occurred in the 
enforcement of evictions from repossessions of owner-occupied housing, 
peaking in 2012 with 375 cases. The same year, 5600 properties were sold in 
forced auctions, which is a very high number in international comparison 
(Kenna et al. 2016: 61). Indeed, one of my interviewees stated that “There are in 
my opinion more people displaced by repossessions than by the early 
privatization” (Interview 1). Most of the Scandinavian banks founded their 
own property companies to manage and ultimately sell repossessed property.  
One of the most worrisome features for over-indebted homeowners is that “in 
the case of mortgage default at the moment, banks can repossess the property, 
take second properties if owned, and also recoup further debt from the future 
Dorothee Bohle 
37 
earnings of the borrower” (Traynor 2009). Successive Latvian governments 
tried to change this by shifting some of the risks of underwater mortgages on 
the banks. These attempts by and large failed because (mostly the Nordic) 
banks put up huge resistance. Thus, at the height of the crisis, in 2009, the 
Dombrovkis cabinet proposed laws that aimed at limiting the liability of 
property borrowers in case of default to the current market value of their 
property, rather than the value at the time of the purchase. This would have 
inflicted huge losses on the banks because of the rapid decline in house prices. 
But banks threatened that this would mean the end of lending, and under the 
joint attack of the commercial banks and Bank of Latvia, the laws were shelved 
(Traynor 2009). In 2015, another set of laws, which would have allowed new 
borrowers to choose a “non-recourse” mortgage – a mortgage that gives them 
the option of returning the keys to the banks in case they are unable to repay 
their loans – were significantly watered down after the Nordic banks 
threatened that they were to cease to issue loans altogether. Indeed, in what 
looked like a collusion of the Nordic banks, all major mortgage lenders doubled 
their down payment requirements, forcing lawmakers to backtrack on their 
proposal. A watered down version of the law was finally adopted, allowing 
homeowners the choice between a significantly more expensive non-recourse 
and a cheaper full recourse mortgage (Eglitis 2015, Kaza 2015).   
Overall, despite a relatively fast recovery of the economy, mortgage lending 
has remained slow since the crisis broke out, while house prices have been 
increasing, especially in Riga. This, however, is mostly due to the Latvian 
government offering second residency for foreigners who buy real estate. The 
second residency scheme has attracted above all wealthy Russians who buy up 
luxury apartments in the capital city (nomadcapitalist, 3/2014). For locals, 
access to housing remains difficult, with unemployment still high, incomes 
low, and banks only lending cautiously (IMF 2016b). To revive the stagnant 
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mortgage market, more recently the government has decided on a state 
guarantee program for families with children. The main aim of the program is 
to reduce the down payment for first time buyers, with state guarantees 
increasing per number of children (The Baltic Course 2016). 
 
4.3 Summary 
This section has argued that the crisis has revealed the hierarchical nature of 
core-periphery financial relations. In light of a sudden stop of capital flows, 
none of the four countries were able to stabilize their economies on their own. 
The conditions set by the ultimate guardians of their transnationally integrated 
financial systems differed, as did domestic crisis responses. Thus, Hungary and 
Iceland have by and large rejected the previous paths of financialization, with 
Hungary’s answer being more extreme, while Ireland and Latvia have mostly 
accepted the discipline of financialization. Table 4 summarizes some of the 
trends of housing (finance) in these countries after the crisis. The last, 
concluding section will take a step back and ask how the different policy 
responses relate to the broader trajectories these countries have embarked 
upon, and what all of this tells of for the future of peripheral housing 
finance(ialization). 
Table 4  
Selected indicators of housing (finance) after the crisis 
 Homeownership 
rate (2014) 
(in brackets: 
homeowners 
with mortgages) 
Residential 
lending  
(gross, average 
annual growth 
rate 2012-
2015) 
Gross fixed 
investment 
in housing  
(average 
annual 
growth 
2012-2015) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
(households, 
2015) 
Nominal house 
prices 
(average annual 
growth 2012-
2015) 
Latvia 80 (20) 10 -2 7 4 
Hungary 86 (18) 16 -7 17 3 
Iceland 78 (63) n.a. 7 7 7 
Ireland 70 (34) 41 1 18 9 
Sources: Column 1: EU-SILC. Columns 2, 3, 5: EMF 2016. Column 4: IMF country reports for Latvia, 
Hungary and Iceland, ECB 2016 for Ireland. 
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5. Concluding discussion: The past and future of 
peripheral housing finance  
Puzzled by the rapid increase of mortgage lending in a number of European 
peripheral countries, this paper has shed light on the trajectories of housing 
finance in four countries. It argued that many differences notwithstanding, 
there are a number of common themes that run through the rapid build-up of 
mortgage debt. EU-induced external liberalization, deregulation, and, in the 
East Central European cases, privatization of the banking sector has washed 
these countries with excessive liquidity. Additionally, integration into the 
European single market, economic area, or eurozone dramatically decreased 
the costs of borrowing for the peripheral countries and allowed them to escape 
their narrow domestic deposit base. An important share of international 
liquidity went into housing finance. In three of the four countries, 
unexperienced banks were at the origin of the mortgage booms and in all 
countries governments and supervisory authorities were either unwilling or 
unable (and typically both) to rein in banks and the risky lending boom.  
Is there anything specific to these mortgage booms which makes them 
peripheral? After all, the liberalization of mortgage finance, an increasing 
reliance on foreign funding, and regulatory forbearance has been the hallmark 
of mortgage booms prior to the crisis elsewhere, notably in the US and UK 
(Rodrigez and Aalbers 2016). I show that, first, the nature of demand for 
housing finance differs. Demand for housing finance was high in Europe’s 
periphery and reflects the predominance of high homeownership rates which 
are related to late industrialization. The nature of high demand differs: in 
Europe’s East, high homeownership rates, virtually non-existing mortgage 
markets, and stagnant housing construction during the 1990s have led to a 
pent-up demand for housing and housing finance (Bohle 2014). In Europe’s 
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North West, highly decommodified property based welfare systems have 
become marketized (Norris 2016). This differs from the more sophisticated 
deepening of already commodified mortgage finance and its expansion to 
subprime segments particularly in the US.  
Second, the form of internationalization of mortgage finance differs. In the four 
cases, banks were at the origin of mortgage booms. In Europe’s East, 
transnational banks were dominantly financed by parent banks, whereas in the 
two Northwestern countries, domestic banks borrowed on wholesale markets 
via interbank lending. In contrast to the US or UK, securitization of mortgages 
and their selling to institutional investors did not play a key role.  
Third, all countries leveraged up internationally without the benefits of a 
reserve currency (Schwartz 2011). This is what made these countries 
particularly vulnerable to sudden stops and reversal in credit flows. As 
Schwartz writes, “[t]he United States survived its catastrophe and continues to 
have access to global credit markets without much penalty because the dollar 
is the international reserve currency.” (ibid: 292). The sudden reversals of credit 
flows shook the foundations of the peripheral financial systems, and their 
stabilization has revealed the hierarchical nature of peripheral financialization. 
None of the countries were strong enough to stabilize their financial systems 
on their own, and it was only during the crisis that it turned out who the 
ultimate guardian of their transnationally integrated financial systems was 
(Pistor 2009: 3). The international constraints stemming from the conditionality 
of the ultimate guardians differed considerably across the cases. Arguably, 
Hungary was the country least constrained. Its banking sector was less exposed 
to the crisis as it only faced a liquidity crisis resulting from the turmoil in the 
foreign currency swap market (Aslund and Dombrovksis 2011). In the 
Hungarian case, it was the Vienna initiative that brought about the ultimate 
Dorothee Bohle 
41 
guardian of its financial system: coordinated by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, transnational banks, regulators, central 
banks and international financial institutions agreed on the terms of stabilizing 
the banking system. In the agreements, parent banks committed to support 
their subsidiaries in the region, roll-over their credits, and capitalize them 
adequately. In those countries that had stand-by agreements with the IMF, 
banks made their commitment dependent on their host governments’ 
compliance (Pistor 2011). Ultimately, the reliance on foreign banks allowed 
Hungary to outsource much of its troubles to the parent banks.  
This was also true for Latvia, with the difference that its financial troubles were 
triggered by a run on its biggest domestic bank, PAREX. In response to the run, 
the government took over the majority control for a symbolic price. The costs 
of recapitalizing and the need for restructuring PAREX were the major reasons 
why the Latvian government turned to the IMF (Aslund and Dombrovskis 
2011: 35). The run on PAREX however also affected the subsidiaries of Swedish 
banks negatively, and without a bailout from the Swedish parent banks the 
financial system would have crashed. After the crisis, Swedish banks, however, 
reduced their exposure to the Baltic States, making access to credit more 
difficult (Coppola, 28/5/2015).  
The constraints facing Ireland and Iceland were of higher magnitude, but of 
polar opposite nature. Iceland found out that there was no ultimate guardian 
that was able or willing to stabilize its vastly oversized banking sector. Its own 
Central Bank was unable to act as lender of last resort and an international 
stand-by credit by the IMF and the Nordic countries helped to stabilize the 
economy; but only after the banking sector collapsed, Iceland imposed capital 
controls, and foreign creditors and shareholders experienced massive losses. In 
contrast, Ireland discovered that belonging to the eurozone does not provide 
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shelter for peripheral countries in crisis. Because of the no bailout clause of the 
Maastricht treaty, it found its access to capital markets blocked, while its Troika 
rescue package reflected concerns for the eurozone system as a whole, rather 
than the particular Irish woes. As a consequence, Ireland had the harshest 
conditions for the revival of is defunct banking system.  
What do these different constraints mean for the future of housing 
financialization? I have highlighted two issues – on the one hand the policy 
responses through which each country tried to negotiate the international 
constraints, and on the other hand, the level of mortgage debt prior to the crisis. 
Thus, Hungary and Iceland have by and large rejected the previous paths of 
marketization of mortgages, while Ireland and Latvia have submitted to the 
discipline of international finance. However, given their different initial 
financial depth of mortgage markets, results of policy choices differ. Arguably, 
the Hungarian policy response has successfully reversed the path of housing 
financialization. Squeezing the banks has certainly relieved upper middle class 
over-indebted homeowners, but it also has led to a dramatic decline in 
mortgage lending. This is welcomed by the government, which seeks to limit 
the overall role of finance in the economy and to direct bank lending towards 
productive capacities. As it does not offer comprehensive alternatives to home-
ownership or public housing finance, the consequence is a return to the 
peripheral housing regime. Interestingly, the outcome is quite similar in Latvia. 
In this case, however, it is unintended: In contrast to Hungary, the Latvian 
authorities never sought to curtail lending or rein in the banking sector. Rather, 
a combination of more prudential international norms, more cautious lending 
by the international banks, and borrowers whose economic outlook is still not 
stable have driven out housing financialization for the time being.  
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This contrasts with the Irish case. Banks remain major players in mortgage and 
housing markets. Here, arguably policy responses have taken financialization 
of housing to the next level. Limited supply and rising house prices combine 
with tight mortgage lending to produce increasing wealth inequality, with a 
“generation landlord” increasing their housing capital at the costs of 
“generation rent” (Ronald et. al 2015, Regan 2016).  
While there might be alternatives to being stuck once again in the familial 
housing regime, and the increasing inequality of wealth that the post-crisis 
phase of financialization produces, the Icelandic post-crisis pathway shows 
that this is a thin line to walk. The state took back control over mortgage 
finance, ruled out risky forms of peripheral financialization, and tried to revive 
public housing. At the same time, however, the IMF (2015: n.p.) has recently 
warned that “the loss-making government-owned Housing Financing Fund, 
which currently dominates the mortgage market, needs to be unwound as its 
business model is no longer viable and replaced by a financially viable 
successor housing program”.  
Table 5 summarizes the findings.  
Table 5 
The future of peripheral housing financialization 
 Domestic rejection of financialization 
Yes No 
 
 
International 
Contraints 
 
high 
Reduced 
financialization, but 
vulnerability remains 
(Iceland) 
Financialization taken 
to a new level 
(Ireland) 
 
low 
Voluntary return to 
peripheral housing 
regime 
(Hungary) 
Unintended return to 
peripheral housing 
regime 
(Latvia) 
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While the paper thus shed some light on the development and diversity of 
peripheral housing finance, future research needs to connect peripheral 
housing finance better to other aspects of the research program of varieties of 
residential capitalism. Thus, as mentioned in the first section, not all peripheral 
countries have opened up to financialization in the first place. The varieties of 
peripheral housing finance might thus be even broader than discussed in this 
paper. In addition, it would be important to link the findings of this paper to 
the broader comparative capitalism literature and to evaluate the consequences 
for macroeconomic growth, social stability, welfare states and political 
behaviour. 
  
Dorothee Bohle 
45 
References  
Journal articles, books, reports 
Aalbers, Manuel B. 2008. “The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market 
Crisis.” Competition & Change 12 (2): 148–166. 
———. 2016. The Financialization of Housing: A Political Economy Approach. Milten Park 
and New York: Routledge. 
Aalbers, Manuel B., and Brett Christophers. 2014. “Centring Housing in Political 
Economy.” Housing, Theory and Society 31 (4): 373–394. 
Allen, Judith, James Barlow, Jesús Leal, Thomas Maloutas, and Liliana Padovani. 2004. 
Housing and Welfare in Southern Europe. Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Ansell, Ben. 2014. “The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the 
Welfare State.” American Political Science Review 108 (02): 383–402. 
Aslund, Anders, and Valdis Dombrovskis. 2011. How Latvia Came Through the Financial 
Crisis. 1st ed. Institute of International Economics. 
Baccaro, Lucio, and Jonas Pontusson. 2016. “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy 
The Growth Model Perspective.” Politics & Society 44 (2): 175–207. 
Bakker, Bas Berend, and Anne-Marie Gulde. 2010. “The Credit Boom in the EU New 
Member States: Bad Luck or Bad Policies?” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1620249. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1620249. 
Banai, Adam, Julia Kiraly, and Marton Nagy. 2011. “Home High Above and Home Deep 
Down Below -- Lending in Hungary.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1939727. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1939727. 
Bank of Iceland. 2016. Financial Stability Report. Vol. 14. 1 vols. 2014. 
http://www.cb.is/publications/publications/financial-stability/. 
Barnes, Lucy, and Anne Wren. 2012. “The Liberal Model in the Crisis: Continuity and 
Change in Great Britain and Ireland.” In Coping with Crisis: Government Reactions 
to the Great Recession, edited by Nancy Bermeo and Jonas Pontusson, 287–324. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Becker, Joachim, Johannes Jäger, Bernhard Leubolt, and Rudy Weissenbacher. 2010. 
“Peripheral Financialization and Vulnerability to Crisis: A Regulationist 
Perspective.” Competition & Change 14 (3–4): 225–247. 
Benediktsdóttir, Sigríður, Jon Danielsson, and Gylfi Zoega. 2011. “Lessons from a 
Collapse of a Financial System.” Economic Policy 26 (66): 183–235. 
Berthaud, Fabrice, and Stéphane Colliac. 2010. “Which Emerging Countries Have 
Experienced a Sudden Stop of Capital Inflows during the Recent Crisis.” Trésor-
Economics 76: 1–8. 
Blanchard, Olivier J., Mark Griffiths, and Bertrand Gruss. 2013. “Boom, Bust, Recovery: 
Forensics of the Latvia Crisis.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2013 (2): 
325–388. 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
46 
Bohle, Dorothee. 2014. “Post-Socialist Housing Meets Transnational Finance: Foreign 
Banks, Mortgage Lending, and the Privatization of Welfare in Hungary and 
Estonia.” Review of International Political Economy 21 (4): 913–48.  
Bohle, Dorothee, and Béla Greskovits. 2012. Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Bukeviciute, Lina, and Daniel Kosicki. n.d. “Real Estate Price Dynamcis, Housing Finance 
and Relate Macro-Prudential Tools in the Baltics.” ECFIN Country Focus 9 (2012): 
1–8. 
Callon, Michel. 1998. “An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities 
Revisited by Sociology.” The Sociological Review 46 (S1): 244–269. 
Committee on Constitution, Justice, and Standing Order of the Hungarian Parliament 
(2012). Jelentése a 2002–2010 közötti lakossáagi deviza-eladósodás okainak 
feltárásáról, valamint az esetleges kormányzati felelösségvizsgálatá [‘Report about 
the causes of and the possible governmental responsibilities in residential 
indebtedness in foreign currency between 2002–2010’], Budapest, February 13, 
http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/05881/05881.pdf translated by Dénes 
Csurgó. 
Decressin, Jörg, Wim Fonteyne, and Hamid Faruqee. 2007. Integrating Europe’s Financial 
Markets. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
Dellepiane, Sebastian, Niamh Hardiman, and Jon Las Heras. 2013. “Building on Easy 
Money: The Political Economy of Housing Bubbles in Ireland and Spain.” UCD 
Geary Institute Discussion Paper 2013/18. 
http://irserver.ucd.ie/handle/10197/4929. 
Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government. 2014. “Social 
Housing Strategy 2020: Support, Supply, Reform.”  
EBRD. 2010. “Mortgages in Transition Economies. The Legal Framework for Mortgages 
and Mortgage Securities.” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
Eglitis, Gatis, Balazs Forgo, Radoslav Krastev, Ingrid Toming, and Christian Weise. n.d. 
“Assessing Business Practices in Latvia’s Financial Sector.” ECFIN Country Focus 
11 (6): 1–9. 
Eihmanis, Edgars. 2017. “Cherry-Picking External Constraints: Latvia and EU Economic 
Governance, 2008–2014.” Journal of European Public Policy, online first. 
doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1363267. 
Ekholdt Christensen, Jakob. n.d. “The Economic Crisis in Ireland, Iceland and Latvia.” 
Monetary Review 1st Quarter 2011. Danish National Bank. 
EMF. various years. “Hypostat. A Review of Europe’s Mortgage and Housing Markets.” 
European Mortgage Federation. 
Enoch, Charles, and İnci Ötker-Robe, eds. 2007. Rapid Credit Growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Endless Boom or Early Warning? New York: Palgrave. 
Epstein, Gerald A. 2005. Financialization and the World Economy. Cheltenham, U.K.; 
Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Epstein, Rachel A. 2014. “When Do Foreign Banks ‘Cut and Run’? Evidence from West 
European Bailouts and East European Markets.” Review of International Political 
Economy 21 (4): 847–877. 
Dorothee Bohle 
47 
Erbenova, Michaela, Yan Liu, and Magnus Saxegaard. 2011. Corporate and Household 
Debt Distress in Latvia: Strengthening the Incentives for a Market-Based Approach 
to Debt Resolution. International Monetary Fund. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1988. Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to 
Power. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
European Court of Auditors. 2015. “Special Report No 18/2015: Financial Assistance 
Provided to Countries in Difficulties.” Luxembourg. 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35016. 
Fernandez, Rodrigo, and Manuel B. Aalbers. 2016. “Financialization and Housing: 
Between Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism.” Competition & Change 20 (2): 
71–88. 
Glick, Reuven, Kevin J. Lansing, and others. 2010. “Global Household Leverage, House 
Prices, and Consumption.” FRBSF Economic Letter 1.  
Gros, Daniel, and Cinzia Alcidi. 2015. “Country Adjustment to a ‘Sudden Stop’: Does the 
Euro Make a Difference?” International Economics and Economic Policy 12 (1): 5–
20. 
Hall, Peter A. 2014. “Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis.” West European Politics 
37 (6): 1223–1243. 
Hart-Landsberg, Martin. 2013. “Lessons from Iceland: Capitalism, Crisis, and 
Resistance.” Monthly Review 65 (5). https://www.questia.com/read/1P3-
3105420561. 
Hartmann, Philipp. 2015. “Real Estate Markets and Macroprudential Policy in Europe.” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 47 (S1): 69–80. 
Hassel, Anke. 2014. “Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of Capitalism and the Crisis 
in Southern Europe.” LSE “Europe in Question” (LEQS) Discussion Paper Series, no. 
76. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436454. 
Hay, Colin, Jari M. Riiheläinen, Nicola J. Smith, and Matthew Watson. 2008. “Ireland: The 
Outlier Inside.” In The Euro at Ten: Europeanization, Power, and Convergence, 
edited by Kenneth Dyson, 182–203. Oxford University Press.  
Hegedüs, József. 2011. “Housing Policy and the Economic Crisis–the Case of Hungary.” In 
Housing Markets and the Global Financial Crisis: The Uneven Impact on Households., 
edited by R. Forrest and N. M. Yip, 113–130. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing.  
———. 2013. “Housing Privatization and Restitution.” In Social Housing in Transition 
Countries, edited by József Hegedüs, Martin Lux, and Nóra Teller, 33–49. New York 
and London: Routledge. 
Henilane, Inita. 2016. “Review of Existing and New Long-Term Housing Financial 
Instruments in Latvia.” 9th International Scientific Conference “Business and 
Management 2016” Vilnius: VGTU Technika. doi:10.3846/bm.2016.11. 
Honohan, Patrick. 2010. “Euro Membership and Bank Stability–Friends or Foes? Lessons 
from Ireland.” Comparative Economic Studies 52 (2): 133–157. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2006. “Republic of Latvia: Selected Issues.” 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=19984.0. 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
48 
———. 2012. “World Economic Outlook 2012: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain.” 
Washington, D.C: IMF. 
https://www.google.it/search?q=IMF+world+economic+outlook+2012&ie=utf-
8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-
b&gfe_rd=cr&ei=JLnbV4uMNcrD8gf9la3gDA#q=imf+world+economic+outlook+2
012+groth+resuming+dangers+remain. 
———. 2016a. “Hungary. 2016 Article IV Consultation: Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Hungary.” IMF Country Report 16/107. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Hungary-2016-
Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-43878. 
———. 2016b. “Latvia. 2016 Article IV Consultation: Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Latvia.” IMF Country Report 16/171. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16171.pdf. 
———. 2017. “Iceland. 2017 Article IV Consultation: Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Iceland.” IMF Country Report 17/163. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/06/22/Iceland-2017-
Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-44998. 
Johnson, Juliet, and Andrew Barnes. 2015. “Financial Nationalism and Its International 
Enablers: The Hungarian Experience.” Review of International Political Economy 
22 (3): 535–69.  
Johnston, Alison, Bob Hancké, and Suman Pant. 2014. “Comparative Institutional 
Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Comparative Political Studies 
47 (13): 1771–1800. 
Johnston, Alison, and Aidan Regan. 2017. “Global Finance, Labor Politics, and the 
Political Economy of Housing Prices.” Politics & Society, online first, DOI: 
10.1177/0032329217702102. 
Jordà, Òscar, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor. 2014. “The Great Mortgaging: 
Housing Finance, Crises, and Business Cycles.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w20501. 
Józon, Mónika. 2015. “Country Report Hungary.” In Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion 
in Europe, edited by Hans-W. Micklitz and Irina Domurath, 85–98. Farnham, 
Surrey, England; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate. 
Kelly, John, and Mary Everett. 2004. “Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth in 
Ireland.” Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, Quarterly 
Bulletin Article, Autumn, 91–112. 
Kenna, Padraic, Lars Benjaminsen, Volker Busch-Geertsema, and Sergio Nassare-Aznar. 
2016. “Pilot project – Promoting protection of the right to housing – Homelessness 
prevention in the context of evictions.” European Commission, Directorate-
General Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 
Lane, Philip R. 2015. “The Funding of the Irish Domestic Banking System During the 
Boom”. http://www.ssisi.ie/SSISI2015_LANE_16january2015_all.pdf. 
Lapavitsas, Costas. 2013. Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All. 
London; New York: Verso. 
Lütz, Susanne, and Matthias Kranke. 2014. “The European Rescue of the Washington 
Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries.” 
Review of International Political Economy 21 (2): 310–338. 
Dorothee Bohle 
49 
Mair, Peter. 2011. “Bini Smaghi vs. the Parties: Representative Government and 
Institutional Constraints.” EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2011/22. 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/16354. 
Mak, Istvan, and Judit Pales. 2009. “The Role of the FX Swap Market in the Hungarian 
Financial System.” MnB Bulletin 4 (1): 24–34. 
McDonald, Frank, and Kathy Sheridan. 2008. The Builders: How a Small Group of 
Property Developers Fueled the Building Boom and Transformed Ireland. Penguin. 
Méndez Pinedo, Elvira, and Irina Domurath. 2015. “Country Report Iceland.” In 
Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe, edited by Hans-W. Micklitz and 
Irina Domurath, 85–98. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate. 
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 2015. House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great 
Recession, and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again. University of Chicago 
Press.  
Mitra, Pradeep, Marcelo Selowsky, and Juan Zalduendo. 2010. Turmoil at Twenty: 
Recession, Recovery, and Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union. World Bank Publications. 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rHy_XvT7ZWEC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5
&dq=Turmoil+at+20+Mitra&ots=wFx1xuuOVH&sig=4eoiei5S2CxDYgIK7lLpsXnSV
sQ. 
Norris, Michelle. 2016. Property, Family and the Irish Welfare State. Cham, Switzerland: 
Springer.  
——— and Dermot Coates. 2014. “How Housing Killed the Celtic Tiger: Anatomy and 
Consequences of Ireland’s Housing Boom and Bust.” Journal of Housing and the 
Built Environment 29 (2): 299–315. 
Ólafsson, Stefán. 2011. “Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Level of Living Consequences.” 
Social Research Centre, University of Iceland Working Paper 3/2011. 
https://rafhladan.is/bitstream/handle/10802/8057/icelands_financial_crisis_and
_level_of_living.pdf?sequence=1. 
Osa, Ilze. 2005. “Housing Finance in Latvia.” In Housing Finance Markets in Transition 
Economies, 185–207. OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-
and-investment/housing-finance-markets-in-transition-economies/housing-
finance-in-latvia_9789264010178-15-en. 
O’Toole, Fintan. 2011. Enough Is Enough: How to Build a New Republic. Main edition. 
London: Faber & Faber. 
Palacin, Jose, Robert C. Shelburne. 2005. The Private Housing Market in Eastern Europe 
and the CIS. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Discussion Paper 
Series No.2005.5. 
http://www.unece.org.net4all.ch/fileadmin/DAM/oes/disc_papers/ECE_DP_2005
-5.pdf. 
Pistor, Katharina. 2009. “Into the Void: Governing Finance in Central & Eastern Europe.” 
SSRN Scholarly Paper 355. Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper. New 
York: Columbia University. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1476889. 
———. 2012. “Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons from the Vienna 
Initiative.” Journal of Globalization and Development 2 (2): Article 2, 25 pages. 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
50 
Ronald, Richard, Justin Kadi, and Chris Lennartz. 2015. “Homeownership-Based Welfare 
in Transition.” Critical Housing Analysis 2 (1): 52–64.  
Rózsavölgyi, Réka, and Viktória Kovács. 2005. “Housing Subsidies in Hungary: Curse or 
Blessing.” ECFIN Country Focus 2 (18): 1–6. 
Rudzitis, Edmunds, Varanauskiene, Triin Messimas, and Merike Kukk. 2014. “Baltic 
Household Outlook.”. SEB Banka. 
https://www.google.it/search?q=Rudzitis+baltic+household+outlook&ie=utf-
8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b&gfe_rd=cr&ei=lNP7V7m4GIXe8gfs5aSYDA. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. 2011. “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of 
Democracy.” LEQS Paper, no. 36. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1852316. 
Schelkle, Waltraud. 2012. “A Crisis of What? Mortgage Credit Markets and the Social 
Policy of Promoting Homeownership in the United States and in Europe.” Politics 
& Society 40 (1): 59–80. 
Schwartz, Herman. 2009. Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital, and the 
Housing Bubble. Cornell University Press. 
———. 2011. “Iceland’s Financial Iceberg: Why Leveraging up Is a Titanic Mistake 
without a Reserve Currency.” European Political Science 10 (3): 292–300. 
Schwartz, Herman M., and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. 2009. The Politics of Housing Booms 
and Busts. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Seabrooke, Leonard, and Eleni Tsingou. 2014. “Distinctions, Affiliations, and 
Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Expert Groups.” Journal of European 
Public Policy 21 (3): 389–407. 
Stephens, Mark, Martin Lux, and Petr Sunega. 2015. “Post-Socialist Housing Systems in 
Europe: Housing Welfare Regimes by Default?” Housing Studies 30 (8): 1210–
1234. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert, Cédric Durand, and Ludwig List. 2016. “European Growth 
Models and Working Class Restructuring. An International Post-Keynesian 
Political Economy Perspective.” Environment and Planning A ahead of print: 1–25. 
Struyk, Raymond J. 1996. Economic Restructuring of the Former Soviet Bloc: The Case of 
Housing. The Urban Insitute. 
Sveinsson, Jón-Rúnar. 2011. “Housing in Iceland in the Aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis.” In Housing Markets and the Global Financial Crisis: The Uneven Impact on 
Households., edited by R. Forrest and N. M. Yip, 57–73. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing.  
Threshold Charity. 2014. “Buy-to-Let Mortgage Arrears: Measures Needed to Protect 
Homes of Tenants and Stability of Private Rented Sector.” Submission to Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform. 
Viken, Bård Skaar. 2011. “The Birth of a System Born to Collapse: Laissez-Faire the 
Icelandic Way.” European Political Science 10 (3): 312–323. 
Wade, Robert, and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir. 2010. “Lessons from Iceland.” New Left Review, 
II, no. 65 (October): 5–29. 
Dorothee Bohle 
51 
Whitehead, Christine, Kathleen Scanlon, and Jens Lunde. 2014. The Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on European Housing Systems: A Review. SIEPS. 
http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/Sieps%202014_2%20webb_NY.pdf. 
Zubkova, Jelena, Egils Kauzens, Ivars Tillers, and Martins Prusis. 2003. “Financial Market 
in Latvia.” Latvijas Banka. 
 
Newspaper articles and blogs 
Bogler, Dan. Financial Times, April 28 2015. “Hungary on a Roll from Forced Swapping 
out of Swiss Franc Loans.” Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/ff72d032-eda7-11e4-a894-00144feab7de-  
Burke-Kennedy, Eoin. 2017. “Troika Wants Government to Reform Repossession Laws.” 
The Irish Times. Accessed August 7. 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland/troika-wants-
government-to-reform-repossession-laws-1.753960 
Coppola, Frances. 2015. “How Do You Say ‘Dead Cat’ in Latvian?” Credit Writedowns Pro. 
May 28. https://pro.creditwritedowns.com/2015/05/how-do-you-say-dead-cat-
in-latvian.html. 
Eglitis, Aaron. 2015. “Nordic Banks Doubling Down Payments Spur Law’s Defeat.” 
Bloomberg.Com, March 6. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-
06/nordic-banks-doubling-down-payments-spur-law-s-defeat. 
Eugene McErlean August 14, 2013. “Are Strategic Defaulters a Myth?” Independent.Ie. 
Accessed August 7. http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/eugene-mcerlean-
are-strategic-defaulters-a-myth-29470765.html. 
Financial Times. 2013. “Saga Ends with Icesave Redemption,” January 29. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/78b96684-6a21-11e2-a80c-
00144feab49a.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3azJrSdHo. 
Hendersen, Andrew. 2014. “How to Get Second Residency in Latvia-Real Estate or 
Business.” Nomad Capitalist. March 19. 
http://nomadcapitalist.com/2014/03/19/buy-real-estate-latvia-get-second-
residency-passport/ 
Lynch, Suzanne. February 8 2014. “IMF Wanted Senior Bondholder ‘Bail-in’ for Ireland.” 
The Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/imf-wanted-
senior-bondholder-bail-in-for-ireland-1.1676854. 
Tax Justice Network. November 11, 2015. “How Ireland Became an Offshore Financial 
Centre.” https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/11/11/how-ireland-became-an-
offshore-financial-centre/. 
Oszkó, Peter. 2012. “Guest Post: Orbán’s Hazy Memory of Debts, Cuts and Economic 
Policy.” Financial Times. January 23. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2012/01/23/guest-post-orbans-hazy-economic-memory/ 
portfolio.hu. 2015. “This Is What Banks in Hungary Offer in Exchange for Lower Bank 
Tax.” Portfolio.Hu EN. May 21. 
http://www.portfolio.hu/en/economy/this_is_what_banks_in_hungary_offer_in_e
xchange_for_lower_bank_tax.29619.html. 
Mortgaging Europe’s periphery 
52 
Regan, Aidan. 2016. “The Housing Crisis Is All about the Politics of Debt.” The Irish 
Economy. July 20. http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2016/07/20/the-
housing-crisis-is-all-about-the-politics-of-debt/. 
Phillips, Matt. 2014. “Welcome to Ireland, Where Mortgage Payments Are Apparently 
Optional.” Quartz. Accessed November 6. http://qz.com/50615/welcome-to-
ireland-where-house-payments-are-optional-apparently/. 
The Irish Times. 2014. “Full Transcript of Weidmann Interview,” January 24. 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/full-transcript-of-weidmann-
interview-1.1666741. 
Traynor, Ian. 2009. “Latvia Threatens Foreign Banks with Huge Losses.” The Guardian, 
October 7, sec. Business. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/oct/07/latvia-crisis-mortgage-
debt. 
“Untangling the Role of Swedish Banks in Latvia’s Financial Woes.” 2009. March 3. 
http://www.thelocal.se/20090303/17962. 
 
Interviews 
Interview 1: with an Economist, Riga, Latvia, 21. September 2015 
Interview 2: with an entrepreneur, Riga, Latvia, 21. September 2015 
Interview 3: with a former cabinet minister, Riga, Latvia, 22. September 2015 
Interview 4: with a former cabinet minister, Riga, Latvia, 22. September 2015 
Interview 5: with an economist, Riga, Latvia, 22. September 2015 
Interview 6: at the Bank of Latvia, Riga, Latvia, 25. September 2015 
 
 
  
Dorothee Bohle 
53 
Recent LEQS papers 
  
Iordanoglou, Chrysafis & Matsaganis, Manos “Why Grexit cannot save Greece (but staying in the Euro 
area might)” LEQS Paper No. 123, August 2017 
 
Saka, Orkun “'Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during the Eurozone crisis” LEQS Paper No. 
122, February 2017 
 
Coulter, Steve “Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, ‘New Labour’ and the Single Currency” LEQS 
Paper No. 121, December 2016 
   
Di Cataldo, Marco “Gaining and losing EU Objective 1 funds: Regional development in Britain and the 
prospect of Brexit” LEQS Paper No. 120, November 2016 
 
Avlijas, Sonja “Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour force participation in post-socialist Eastern 
Europe” LEQS Paper No. 119, November 2016 
 
Crescenzi, Riccardo & Iammarino, Simona. “Global Investments and Regional Development Trajectories: 
the Missing Links” LEQS Paper No. 118, October 2016 
 
Teasdale, Anthony. “The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe” LEQS Paper 
No. 117, October 2016 
 
Campos, Nauro F. & Macchiarelli, Corrado. “Core and Periphery in the European Monetary Union: 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 25 Years Later” LEQS Paper No. 116, September 2016 
 
Foresti, Pasquale & Napolitano, Oreste. “On the Stock Markets’ Reactions to Taxation and Public 
Expenditure” LEQS Paper No. 115, September 2016 
 
Gelepithis, Margarita. “Rethinking the paradox of redistribution: how private insurance and means 
testing can lead to universalizing reform” LEQS Paper No. 114, July 2016 
 
Costa-Font, Joan & Turati, Gilberto. “Regional Health Care Decentralization in Unitary States: Equal 
Spending, Equal Satisfaction?” LEQS Paper No. 113, June 2016 
   
Bilgel, Fırat & Can Karahasan, Burhan. “Thirty Years of Conflict and Economic Growth in Turkey: A 
Synthetic Control Approach” LEQS Paper No. 112, June 2016  
 
Kochenov, Dimitry. “EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union. How Inevitable Is the Radical 
Downgrading of Rights?” LEQS Paper No. 111, June 2016 
 
Marzinotto, Benedicta. “Income Inequality and Macroeconomic Imbalances under EMU” Paper No. 110, 
May 2016 
 
Luca, Davide. “Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain policy effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s 
central management of public investment” Paper No. 109, April 2016 
 
De Grauwe, Paul, Ji, Yuemei & Steinbach, Armin. “The EU debt crisis: Testing and revisiting 
conventional legal doctrine” Paper No. 108, April 2016  
 
Vlandas, Tim. “The impact of the elderly on inflation rates in developed countries” Paper No. 107, March 
2016 
 
Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Tunali, Cigdem “The Sustainability of External Imbalances in the European 
Periphery” Paper No. 106, March 2016
  
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
 
 
 
